Doctoral Programme Quantitative Economics

Erich-Schneider-Seminar

Weekly seminar of the Department of Economics on mondays, 4:15 - 5:30 p.m.

Organizer: Dr. Rüdiger Voss

(Un-)Subscribe to the Erich-Schneider-mailing list

Summer term 2021

10.05.2021: Ralph Ossa, ETH Zürich

May 10, 2021 from 04:15 PM to 05:30 PM

virtual lecture

Speaker: Prof. Ralph Ossa, ETH Zürich

Title: Are Trade Agreements Good for You?

Abstract:

We examine how deep agreements on domestic regulations a§ect welfare in a world where such agreements are ináuenced by producer lobbies. The answer to this question depends in a critical way on whether the agreement focuses on product standards or on production regulations. International cooperation on product standards can decrease welfare, and this is more likely to happen when producer lobbies are stronger. On the other hand, international cooperation on production regulations tends to enhance welfare when lobbying pressures are strong. A key determinant of the welfare impact of deep agreements is whether the interests of producer lobbies in di§erent countries are aligned or in conáict: the former situation tends to occur in the case of product standards, while the latter situation tends to occur in the case of production regulations.

Full paper to be found here: 

Host: Prof. Horst Raff

Zoom-Link:

https://uni-kiel.zoom.us/j/68105309628?pwd=dzJ1QmlPbEpxNWo1UU9MVnE0UUFVQT09

 

 

Add to your iCal calendar

zurück

17.05.2021: Michael Stolpe, IfW; DFG-Cluster of Excellence “Precision Medicine”; Leibniz Research Alliance INFECTIONS

May 17, 2021 from 04:15 PM to 05:30 PM

virtual lecture

Speaker: Dr. Michael Stolpe, IfW; DFG-Cluster of Excellence “Precision Medicine”; Leibniz Research Alliance INFECTIONS

Title: Ethics, Technology and Healthcare Demand in Open Economies

Abstract:

We develop an open economy model to explain how demand for healthcare is influenced by distributional ethics at home and innovation in medical technology abroad.   With international trade in medical technology, countries pursuing distributional objectives may be tempted to use the monopsony power of a national health system to suppress prices and rely on the innovation incentives provided by other sufficiently large countries that do not pursue distributional objectives.  From a global point of view, the private and societal incentives for innovation may diverge which may lead to underinvestment in health and international trade conflicts.Full paper to be found here: 

Host: Prof. Gabriel Felbermayr

Zoom-Link:

https://uni-kiel.zoom.us/j/69850689793?pwd=azlkaXlaVDAvZzRUNzl3L2F5cTFWdz09

 

 

 

Add to your iCal calendar

zurück

28.06.2021: Isabelle Mejean, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, France

Jun 28, 2021 from 04:15 PM to 05:30 PM

WSP1 R401

Speaker: Prof. Isabelle Mejean, CREST

Title: Relationship stickiness and economic uncertainty

Abstract: We study how stickiness in business relationships influences the trade impact of aggregate uncertainty. We first develop a product-level index of relationship stickiness estimated from firm-to-firm trade data. The measure is grounded into a search model in which more stickiness implies longer firm-to-firm trade relationships, conditional on match quality. We then show that relationship stickiness shapes the dynamics of trade in response to uncertainty shocks. Episodes of high macroeconomic uncertainty are associated with less trade, mostly driven by a decrease in the net creation of firm-to-firm relationships. Such adjustments are significantly more pronounced among the most sticky product categories.

Host: Prof. Gabriel Felbermayr

Please use the following Zoom-Link:

https://uni-kiel.zoom.us/j/64154481086?pwd=T3lyUStkYUp5VjBsSVBDNi9sS3BZUT09

 

Add to your iCal calendar

zurück

20.09.2021: Roberto Dell'Anno, University of Salerno

Sep 20, 2021 from 04:15 PM to 05:30 PM

Speaker: Prof. Roberto Dell'Anno, University of Salerno

Title: The Trojan Horse in the peer-review process of fee-charging economic journals

Abstract:

This paper aims to unmask the inadequacy of the review process of a sample of fee-charging journals in economics. We submitted a bait-manuscript to 104 academic economic journals to test whether there is a difference in the peer-review process between Article Processing Charges (APC) journals and Traditional journals which do not require a publication fee. The submitted bait-article was based on completely made-up data, with evident errors in terms of methodology, literature, reporting of results, and quality of language. Nevertheless, about half of the APC journals fell in the trap. Their editors accepted the article in the journals and required to pay the publication fee. We conclude that the Traditional model has a more effective incentive-mechanism in selecting articles, based on quality standards. Otherwise, we confirm that the so-called “Predatory Journals” – i.e. academic journals which accept papers without a quality check – exploit the APC scheme to increase their profits. They are also able to enter whitelists (e.g. Scopus, COPE). Accordingly, poor-quality articles published on APC journals shed the light on the weakness of methodologies based on a mechanical inclusion of academic journals in scientific database indexes, succeeding in being considered for bibliometric evaluations of research institutions or scholars’ productivity.

Host: Prof. Christian Seidl

Zoom:

https://uni-kiel.zoom.us/j/69941298983?pwd=TmdLenU0bmlOZTJsQkg0ZGRaU25VZz09

 

 

 

Dr. Rüdiger Voss

Add to your iCal calendar

zurück