Financial Frictions and Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from Japanese Microdata

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Abstract

We use Japanese microdata for the period 1980 to 2000 to examine how financial market frictions affect foreign direct investment (FDI). We seek evidence for two possible transmission channels from financial shocks to FDI: (i) a collateral channel, whereby changes in the value of collateral affect investors' ability to borrow; and (ii) a lending channel, whereby changes in bank health affect banks' ability to lend. We find evidence that both transmission channels are statistically significant and economically important.

JEL-Classification: F23, L20.

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1 Introduction

The global financial crisis was accompanied by a worldwide collapse of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to UNCTAD (2011, Table I.1), world outflows of FDI were 46% lower in 2009 compared to 2007, with the drop in outflows from developed countries exceeding 50%. Such a collapse of FDI is worrying because FDI has been one of the main driving forces of globalization in the past decades: foreign affiliate sales have exceeded world trade for more than two decades (see UNCTAD, 2004). Moreover, FDI plays an essential role as a source of investment capital not least for less-developed countries, a source that has traditionally been thought to be much less volatile than portfolio capital (UNCTAD, 2011).

While the financial crisis obviously had drastic consequences for FDI, it remains unclear what exactly caused FDI to fall. UNCTAD (2011) argues that the main reason for the drop in FDI was the economic downturn and that FDI has been slow to recover due to the fragile world economy and an uncertain regulatory environment. This conclusion is in line with the traditional industrial organization view of FDI, where FDI is based on product market or technology market imperfections, but financial markets are assumed to be frictionless (see, for instance, Markusen, 2002, or Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). According to this view, not only are changes in FDI flows mainly due to product market shocks, there are also no serious consequences for social welfare when firms simply adjust their FDI to changing demand conditions.

The current paper argues that this traditional view is incomplete in that financial frictions may have potentially strong effects on FDI. More precisely, we identify two possible channels through which financial shocks are transmitted to FDI: (i) a lending channel, whereby changes in bank health affect banks' ability to lend; and (ii) a collateral channel, whereby changes in the value of collateral affect investors' ability to borrow.

We base our analysis on microdata on Japanese FDI projects in the United States between 1980 and 2000. These data are ideally suited for our purpose: First, the time period includes the Japanese land-price bubble, and

land in Japan as elsewhere is the dominant form of collateral to secure loans. Following a steep rise in the second half of the 1980s, land prices in Japan dropped by more than half between 1990 and 1993. The changes in land prices are exogenous to the investing firms (see also Gan, 2007a,b). Second, Japanese companies, even large ones, rely heavily on bank financing, more so than, for instance, firms in the United States. Many of these companies saw the health of their main bank decline starting in the mid 1980s. Third, the financial crisis was by and large confined to Japan, local demand conditions in the United States were stable. Hence the gross return from FDI projects in the United States was arguably not affected by the financial trouble in Japan (Klein et al., 2002). These arguments make it persuasive that the strong increase in Japanese FDI projects in the United States from the mid-1980s until 1990 and the subsequent drop were at least in part driven by financial conditions in Japan, in particular by changes in the value of firms' landholdings (or land values for short) and changes in bank health.

By identifying the separate effects of the lending and the collateral channel and showing that economically sizeable and statistically significant effects emanate from both, our paper contributes to the growing literature on the effects of financial constraints on FDI and trade (see Foley and Manova (2014) for a recent survey). It builds on the seminal papers by Froot and Stein (1991) and Klein et al. (2002) who were the first to point out the importance of financial constraints for FDI. Froot and Stein show that a domestic currency depreciation raises the relative wealth of foreign investors, giving them an advantage over domestic investors in bidding for take-over targets. Klein et al. argue that the decline in Japanese FDI after 1990 cannot be explained by this relative-wealth (RW) hypothesis alone, but that the decline is more consistent with weak credit markets caused by the decreasing health of Japanese banks.[1] They show that FDI by Japanese firms is significantly affected by the health of their main banks—what they term the relative-access-to-credit (RAC) hypothesis.[2]

[1] See also Klein and Peek (1994) for further empirical evidence on the RW hypothesis.

[2] Alba et al. (2007) confirm the results of Klein et al. (2002) and show that bank downgrades affect the FDI even of those firms that have access to bond markets and

The current paper complements these two hypotheses by showing that the collateral channel also plays an important role in transmitting financial shocks to FDI.[3] That is, controlling for the RW and the RAC hypotheses as well as for key firm characteristics, we find that land values have a significant effect on FDI activity. In particular, we estimate that reducing each firm's land value from its peak in 1990 to the average level in the pre-boom years 1980-85, a reduction of 77% on average, would have cut the predicted number of investments by half. By comparison a decrease in bank health, measured in terms of the market-to-book ratio of each firm's main bank, from its highest value in 1986 to the sample mean, an average reduction of 61%, would have lowered the predicted number of investments by 42%.

The paper is also connected with the corporate finance literature on the collateral and lending channels. Gan (2007a) uses the bursting of the Japanese real estate bubble to identify the effect of a shock to firms' collateral on fixed investment, which in turn is computed using changes in the capital stock and depreciation. Gan finds a statistically and economically significant impact of the drop in collateral value: a 10 percent decrease in land value leads to a 0.8 percent reduction in the investment rate. Using data at the individual loan level, Gan (2007b) identifies a loan supply shock stemming from banks' real estate exposure. She observes that firms reduce their borrowing from banks with greater exposure to the real-estate market. Gan estimates that this lending channel accounts for 20% of the decline in fixed investment and 25% of the drop in stock market value of Japanese firms. Chaney et al. (2011) use data for the period 1992 to 2007 to study the effect of changes

thus could have financed their investment through bonds. Gibson (1995) shows that bank health affects investment: investment is 30% lower for firms that have one of the lowest-rated banks as their main bank.

[3]Another related paper is by Buch et al. (2009) who model the effect of credit constraints on FDI and, conditional on FDI, on the size of overseas operations. Using microdata on German FDI they find that a larger cash flow raises the propensity to invest abroad and to have more overseas affiliates. We, too, control for cash flow, but go further by, among other things, examining the role of bank health and collateral value. Manova, Wei and Zhang (2014) find that foreign-owned firms perform better in China under credit constraints because they have access to credit through their parent firms. Matsuyama (2005), among others, shows that countries with better-functioning financial markets have a comparative advantage for hosting industries that rely substantially on external credit.

in real estate prices on corporate investment in the United States. They find support for the importance of the collateral channel, with an additional dollar of collateral boosting investment of the average firm by 6 cents.

An obvious difference between these corporate finance papers and ours is that we look at a very specific and important form of investment, namely FDI. But FDI is not only interesting in itself. Rather our focus on new FDI projects has the distinct advantage of allowing us to control for demand conditions in the host country and thus the gross return on investment, which is hard to do when looking at aggregate corporate investment, as domestic financial shocks typically go hand in hand with changes in domestic demand conditions.

Finally our findings mirror to some extent what other authors have found regarding the effect of financial constraints on international trade. Amiti and Weinstein (2011), for instance, use Japanese microdata to look for a lending channel in exports. They regress firm-level exports on a proxy of the health of the firm's main bank, and find that declining bank health significantly hurts exports.[4]

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the theoretical link between financial frictions and FDI to motivate our empirical strategy. In Section 3 we present the Japanese data and discuss stylized facts. In Section 4 we introduce our regression model and examine the statistical significance of the effects stemming from the collateral and lending channels. In Section 5 we provide a quantification of the effects to show that they are indeed economically sizeable, and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains a detailed description of data sources.

[4]Further empirical evidence shows that the recent decrease in world trade has been partly due to the worldwide credit crunch (see Chor and Manova, 2012, Freund and Klapper, 2009), and that financial constraints affect foreign activity (Manova et al., 2009). There is some evidence that FDI is even more vulnerable to credit constraints than exports (see Buch et. al. (2010)).

2 Theoretical Motivation

In this section we provide a theoretical motivation for the empirical analysis, concentrating on the microfoundations of the lending and collateral channels through which financial market frictions may affect the FDI behavior of Japanese firms. According to the seminal contribution by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), credit rationing by a bank arises when the bank is incompletely informed about the riskiness of investment projects proposed by borrowers. Simply put, the bank has to impose tough credit terms to deter projects with a low success probability, and consequently the probability that a project is financed is less than one (as shown by Besanko and Thakor, 1987). How tough these terms are, and thus the probability that a project receives financing depends positively on the bank's cost of refinancing, which in turn depends on bank health. This is the lending channel.

In the case of Japan, it appears reasonable to consider an investor dealing with a single bank. Although Japanese firms tend to borrow from several banks, this assumption is consistent with the empirical observation that Japanese firms have strong ties with their main bank. In this scenario, i.e., with the main bank exercising some market power, it is well known that collateral is an inefficient means of dealing with the incomplete information problem, and would not be used if loan contracts were complete (see Besanko and Thakor, 1987).[5]

A role for collateral therefore arises when loan contracts are incomplete: the bank requires collateral to prevent a borrower from accepting tough credit terms only to then default on the loan. This happens when the success of the borrower's investment project is either not or only partly verifiable. In that case, the borrower could claim that the project was not successful, and by claiming no success could renege on repaying the loan plus interest. The bank would then only be left with the collateral. Hence the bank will always want to deter this opportunistic behavior, and will do so by specifying a collat-

[5]If the banking sector were perfectly competitive, collateral would play a role, but all types would be served in equilibrium (see Bester, 1985). However, there would then be no credit rationing and thus no lending channel. See also Bester (1987) and Schmidt-Mohr (1997).

eral that makes the borrower just indifferent between repaying and reneging. However, acquiring collateral is costly for the borrower (see Barro, 1976).[6] Hence putting up collateral for a project involves an opportunity cost. An increase in the value of existing collateral, such as through an exogenous rise in the value of the borrower's landholding, lowers the opportunity cost and thus raises the probability that the borrower receives funding for a project. This is the collateral channel.

Thus in a financial market environment characterized by asymmetric information between bank and borrower and a threat of opportunistic behavior of the borrower FDI is likely to be driven in part by bank health and the value of collateral. How strong each of these effects is for a particular borrower obviously depends on the size of the informational and contractual frictions. In Japan some firms have very close ties with their main bank through membership in the same *keiretsu* (or industrial group). These ties may mitigate these frictions to some extent. Indeed it has been argued elsewhere that members of a *keiretsu* (or industrial group) enjoy better access to credit compared to non-members (see, for instance, Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998).[7] We account for this in our empirical analysis by interacting both bank health and land value with *keiretsu* membership. The interaction between bank health and keiretsu membership should account especially for the possibility that information asymmetries may be lower when investor and bank are in the same keiretsu. The interaction between land value and keiretsu membership should account for possibly smaller contractual frictions between members of the same keiretsu.

[6]Other classic models on the role of collateral include Hart and Moore (1994), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).

[7]Hoshi et al. (1990) find that distressed firms in Japan perform better when they have strong ties with a main bank or keiretsu, because free-rider problems among creditors and informational asymmetries tend to be smaller. Hoshi et al. (1991) find that investment is less sensitive to liquidity for Japanese firms with close financial ties to large Japanese banks than for firms without those ties, which suggests that information and incentive problems are smaller.

3 The Data

We base our empirical analysis on count data of Japanese FDI projects in the United States between 1980 and 2000.[8] Using the full sample of Toyo Keizai data, Figure 1 shows that the number of FDI projects undertaken by Japanese companies rose quickly from around 100 per year in the early 1980s to nearly 250 per year during the peak years of 1988-1990, but fell just as sharply between 1991-1994. This pattern is remarkable especially when compared with the clearly different FDI pattern of firms from other major FDI source countries (Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, UK).[9]

Many of the Japanese investors in the Toyo Kezai data are privately held companies, for which we do not have access to the firm-specific information required for our study. We thus base our study on a smaller sample of firms (1196 on average over the sample period) for which we have all the required information; 491 of these firms have at least one investment in the US in the sample period.[10] As shown in Figure 2, the investment pattern for the firms in our study is similar to that of the full Toyo Keizai dataset. Our firms made around 30 investments a year through the early 1980s, with this number rising to 120 per year in 1989 and 1990. Investments then quickly fell back to their mid-1980s levels, save for the short-term rise in investments in the mid-1990s.

It is clear from these figures that the pattern of Japanese investment counts cannot be explained by changing product market conditions in the United States alone; instead it has to be driven at least in part by factors specific to Japanese investors.[11] The two factors we look at are, of course,

[8] See the Appendix for a detailed description of the data, the construction of variables, and data sources.

[9] Count data on inward FDI from these other source countries come from the U.S. International Trade Administration's (ITA) dataset on "Foreign Direct Investment into the United States." These data were collected up to 1994.

[10] The fact that a significant share of the firms in the sample do not invest reduces potential selection bias.

[11] This hypothesis is also supported by the pattern of counts of new Japanese FDI projects in Europe, which follows a similar pattern as Japanese FDI counts in the United States.

bank health and the land value. We use two proxies for bank health. One proxy, also used by Klein et al. (2002), consists of Moody's long-term obligation ratings of eleven big commercial banks acting as main banks to the firms in our sample; these ratings are only available starting in 1986 (see Table 1 for the names of these banks and their Moody's ratings). The other proxy is available for the entire sample period, namely the market-to-book value of each firm's main bank (see Amiti and Weinstein, 2011, who use this proxy to look at the effects of bank health on exports).

As indicated by Table 1, the drop in FDI after 1990 coincides with a decline in bank health. But this table also suggests that obligation ratings in the second half of the 1980s certainly did not improve. Banks that received Moody's ratings in 1986 were all rated *Aaa*; however, by 1987 two banks (LTCB, Sanwa) had already been downgraded, and all banks suffered at least two downgrades by 1994. In several cases, banks suffered a multiple-level downgrade during a single year; and, by 1994, each bank had suffered on average a downgrade of 3.5 levels. The few cases where banks were upgraded occurred in the late 1990s, and typically these banks were quickly downgraded again.

When using the market-to-book value, we are able to examine the health of a far greater number of banks than when we rely on the Moody's ratings. More precisely, it allows us to examine the health of 54 banks.[12] However, over 75% of firms, and over 85% of firm-year observations in our data, have one of the 11 Moody's rated banks as their main bank. In addition, a high degree of correlation exists between the two measures of bank health (0.74).[13] Using the market-to-book value, Figure 3 shows that average bank health started to decline around 1986, when the Japanese financial system started to be deregulated and big companies gained limited direct access to the bond

[12]Each of the 54 banks serves as main bank for between 1 and 178 firms in the sample. The average is 28 firms, the mean is 4 firms. The 11 banks, for which we have Moody's ratings, are the main bank for on average 114 firms.

[13]From authors' calculations. The Moody's ratings were converted to a numerical value (since there are 9 Moody's ratings, we set Aaa=9, Aa1=8, ..., Baa2=1) and weighted by their client totals to calculate the correlation coefficient. The unweighted correlation is 0.78.

market.[14] This suggests that bank health cannot explain the sharp increase in FDI projects leading up to 1990, at least not in the sense of the RAC hypothesis which posits a positive relationship between bank health and FDI.

This increase in the number of FDI projects mirrors the steep rise in investors' land values in the second half of the 1980s, which is shown in Figure 3. Moreover, after the bursting of the real estate bubble in 1990 we see a steep decline in both land values and FDI. Since land is the main form of collateral to secure bank loans, we use a firm's land value as a proxy for the opportunity cost of putting up collateral to secure financing for an investment project. As explained in more detail in the Appendix, land values are calculated by holding the amount of property fixed at the firm's 1980 level, so changes in the land value do not arise from the purchase or sale of land, but rather from changes in land prices that are exogenous to the firm.

Of course, changes in FDI counts will be affected by macroeconomic conditions, including potentially an increase in the relative wealth of Japanese investors driven by an appreciation of the Yen and rising stock market values of Japanese firms, i.e., Froot and Stein's RW hypothesis. We control for these and other, possibly unobserved macroeconomic effects at the industry level through industry-time fixed effects. Our identification is therefore through variation at the firm level including in the land value and the health of the firm's main bank.

Since we have access to detailed firm-level information, we can control for a number of additional firm characteristics, such as total assets (excluding land), total factor productivity (TFP), previous investment experience, market value, and cash flow, all known to be associated with FDI (see, for instance, Raff et al., 2012). We can also control for whether a firm and its main bank are in the same keiretsu.[15]

[14] In Japan, where securities markets are not as developed as in the US (Yamori and Murakami, 1999), banks remain the preferred source of credit for investors. In fact, during the height of Japanese outward FDI in the late 1980s and early 1990s, investing firms received 66% of their borrowed capital from banks (compared to 39% by U.S. firms during the same time period) (Gibson, 1995).

[15] Keiretsu-affiliated banks lend to both keiretsu members and non-members. In addition, keiretsu firms do not always have as their main bank a bank affiliated with its keiretsu.

It is important to control for firm-level variables and keiretsu membership, because we do observe considerable heterogeneity among firms in terms of land values, total assets, TFP, etc.; see Table 2 for the descriptive statistics of our dataset. As indicated by Table 2, there is also a large degree of heterogeneity between investing firms and the sample as a whole, with investing firms on average having substantially greater land values, total assets and TFP. The rate of keiretsu membership is about 50% higher among investors.

The year 1988 serves as the average date of first investment for the firms in our study. Further examining initial investments reveals that the average firm with an initial investment between 1986-1990 was 8% smaller in terms of total assets as compared to firms whose initial investment took place prior to 1986. In a within-firm comparison, initial investors in 1988 had on average double the land value than just two years prior. Overall, the average initial investor between 1986-1990 had 70% larger land values than two years prior to its investment, 3.5 times the two-year land value growth rate for firms whose initial investment took place prior to 1986. These results suggest that during the FDI boom years some firms that would not normally have undertaken FDI in the United States were enticed to do so. A possible explanation, of course, is that rising land values enabled these firms to obtain financing for FDI projects.

What does not change over time is the share of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in total FDI projects. This share stays roughly constant at just under 10% per year, meaning that a little more than 90% of the projects in our sample are greenfield investments.[16]

[16]Of course, we do not observe the size of these investments and so the size of M&A activity may be large and may have even changed over time. The constant share of M&As is nevertheless an indication that Froot and Stein's RW hypothesis may not be sufficient to explain the pattern of Japanese FDI during the sample period. More precisely, the RW hypothesis explicitly posits that an increase in real wealth of foreign investors increases their chance of outbidding local investors in acquiring local firm assets. If this were a driving force behind the observed Japanese FDI pattern, one would expect this to show up in the M&A share.

4 Empirical Specification and Results

In the data we observe whether a Japanese firm i undertakes an FDI project in the United States in year t. We hence create a dummy variable $FDI_{i,t}$ which takes the value 1 if firm i invests in year t, and zero otherwise. We want to estimate the probability of investment of firm i in year t conditional on a vector of explanatory variables x: $Pr\left[FDI_{i,t} = 1|x\right]$. For this purpose we write $Pr\left[FDI_{i,t} = 1|x\right] = \Lambda(x)$, where Λ denotes the logistic function, and then estimate through maximum likelihood the logit, or log odds, as the following function of the vector of explanatory variables x:

$$\begin{aligned}\ln\left(\frac{\Lambda(x)}{1-\Lambda(x)}\right) &= \beta_1 LandValue_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 BankHealth_{i,t-1} + \\ &\quad \beta_3 Keiretsu_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 LandValue_{i,t-1} \times Keiretsu_{i,t-1} \\ &\quad + \beta_5 BankHealth_{i,t-1} \times Keiretsu_{i,t-1} \\ &\quad + \beta_6 FirmChar_{i,t-1} + \alpha_{s,t} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}.\end{aligned}$$

Our explanatory variables are generally time-varying and lagged by one year to account for the time lag that exists between the decision to invest and the affiliate's start of operation, which is when the investment appears in our dataset. The set of explanatory variables includes the firm's land value ($LandValue_{i,t-1}$), the health of the firm's main bank ($BankHealth_{i,t-1}$), either measured in terms of the market-to-book ratio ($MarketToBook_{i,t-1}$), or alternatively the main bank's Moody's rating, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm is in the same keiretsu as its main bank ($Keiretsu_{i,t-1}$). We also include interaction terms that measure the differential effects of landholding and bank health, respectively, for keiretsu firms ($LandValue_{i,t-1} \times Keiretsu_{i,t-1}$, $BankHealth_{i,t-1} \times Keiretsu_{i,t-1}$). The additional firm-specific characteristics ($FirmChar_{i,t-1}$) include measures of the firm's $TotalAssets_{i,t-1}$, previous $InvestmentExperience_{i,t-1}$, $MarketValue_{i,t-1}$, and $CashFlow_{i,t-1}$. We control for variation across both time and 3-digit industries s through industry-time fixed effects ($\alpha_{s,t}$). We also include firm fixed effects (α_i). Finally, $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term. We report

each variable's effect on the log odds of investment. Positive coefficient estimates indicate an increase in the log odds of an investment occurring, while negative coefficients indicate a decrease in the log odds of investment.

The empirical results of our baseline estimation are summarized in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 report results for a model utilizing only land value and the market-to-book value, with the models differing only by column 2 controlling for 3-digit industry-time and firm fixed effects. We find that both the land value and the market-to-book value have the expected positive and significant effect.[17] We then address the question of whether these variables retain their influence once we control for a broader set of firm-specific characteristics. We first add the keiretsu dummy variable and the keiretsu-interaction terms (column 3). Keiretsu membership is shown to increase a firm's log odds of investment. The interaction between land value and the keiretsu dummy also shows the predicted sign: the sensitivity of the FDI probability with respect to the land value is significantly smaller for firms in the same keiretsu as their bank. This suggests that keiretsu membership may reduce the contractual frictions that would necessitate the use of collateral in lending arrangements. However, the interaction between the market-to-book value and the keiretsu dummy is not significant, which could mean that membership of firm and bank in the same keiretsu may not reduce the informational frictions associated with FDI.

Finally, columns (4) and (5) estimate our model with the full set of firm-specific controls, with column (5) including the industry-time and firm-fixed effects.[18] Note that there are few qualitative differences between these two models and between them and the model in column (3): land value, market-to-book value, the keiretsu dummy, and the land-value-keiretsu interaction term all remain significant determinants of FDI, while we find no statistically significant evidence for the market-to-book-keiretsu interaction effect.

[17]Since the land price index records changes in land prices already with a lag, we ran the regression separately for "contemporaneous" land holdings and lagged land holdings. But this makes no difference for our results.

[18]For robustness, we also estimate the model in column (5) using 2-digit SIC industry-time fixed effects, clustering the standard errors at the firm level. The results are essentially unchanged.

Our results for the firm-level variables are also in line with previous findings in the literature. FDI is positively related with total assets, cash flow, market value and previous investment experience. Bigger firms and firms with a greater cash flow are more likely to do FDI, possibly because they can more easily cover fixed costs associated with FDI. Firms that have a higher market value are also more likely to engage in FDI, possibly because their better relative wealth position makes them more successful when competing against local firms—the RW hypothesis at the firm level. Previous investment experience also increases investment likelihood; this experience may be viewed as reducing the riskiness of the FDI project. The only firm-level control that, while having the correct sign, does not significantly affect a firm's log odds of investment is TFP.[19]

The model in Table 3, column 5 serves as the baseline model for our subsequent regression analysis, which includes the question of whether the impact of bank health and land value remains statistically significant across different subperiods. In Table 4 we report the results of separate regressions for different subperiods.[20] We observe that land value and its interaction with keiretsu remain statistically significant across all time periods, although their effect on the log odds of investment vary especially between the 1980-85 period and the following subperiods. The effect of the market-to-book value turns out not to be statistically significant in the 1986-1900 period.[21] This is the period where bank health strongly declined (Figure 3) while the value of investor landholdings rapidly increased. This may be an indication that banks continued to lend to firms during this period despite their failing health,

[19]Notice that we also checked for additional heterogeneity in firms' sensitivity to land value and bank health. In particular we interacted land value with total assets and the market-to-book value with total assets to see if there were differential effects depending of firm size. We did not find any differential effects for the market-to-book value and only a weakly significant negative coeffiicient for the land-value x total-assets interaction.

[20]Varying the start and end date does not significantly affect our results.

[21]Notice that the coefficient for land value in 1980-85 is statistically different from those in the other three subperiods. There is no statistically significant difference between the land value coefficients in these three subperiods. Regarding the market-to-book value, the coefficient in the 1986-90 period is statistically different from the coefficients in the other subperiods, but the latter are not statistically different from each other.

possibly since firms had a greater ability to collateralize their borrowing.

It is also interesting to note that keiretsu membership does not affect the log odds of investment during the 1986-1990 period. Thus while in this sub-period neither bank health nor keiretsu membership significantly affects investment, it is also the period where a majority of firms in our sample make their first investment (1988) into the United States. This suggests that the significant increase in land value may have allowed firms to invest that were previously unable to do so.

While we use the bank's market-to-book value as our primary measure of bank health, we also check how robust our results are to changes in the bank health measure. To do this, we use Moody's long-term obligation ratings as the measure of bank health. This changes our sample period, since Moody's ratings are not available prior to 1986, and are only available for all of the 11 rated banks beginning in 1988. We use Moody's $Aa2$ rating as the omitted variable, as it is the only rating to appear in each sub-period. Table 5 shows that bank health over the whole sample period 1986-2000 has a significant impact on investment. Firms whose banks had Aaa ratings had slightly higher log odds of investing than those with $Aa2$, while banks whose ratings were at $Aa3$ and below had significantly reduced log odds of investment. However, these effects are not consistent across sub-periods. Similar to the results in Table 4 we find that bank health, now measured by Moody's ratings, does not significantly impact FDI in the 1986-1990 subperiod. In the 1991-1995 subperiod, only firms with $Aa1$-rated banks had a different bank health effect. From 1996 onward, with the exception of $Baa2$, firms with main banks rated $A2$ and below are significantly impacted by bank health. These results indicate a non-linearity in the effect of bank health on FDI log odds: as long as the firm's bank rating is not too bad, the FDI is not affected. But a substantial downgrade has a significant effect. What it also may signal is the relative nature of these bank ratings. $Aa2$ is a relatively middle-of-the-road ranking before 1990, and thus already tends to have a negative effect on the FDI of its customers. But it is the highest rating of a bank in 1995, and thus a bank has to be downgraded several notches below $Aa2$ in order to generate

a significant effect on the log odds of FDI.[22] Whether we use market-to-book values or Moody's ratings to measure bank health makes little difference for the effect of land values and the other explanatory variables.[23]

The richness of our dataset allows us examine firm behavior in several additional ways. First, we compare FDI into affiliates in the firm's core and non-core business lines. Non-core investments may be "riskier" in terms of profitability and survival than core investments, leading to different lending requirements by the firm's main bank. The 2-digit SIC codes of the parent and the affiliate determine whether the affiliate is in the parent's 'core' (same 2-digit SIC) or 'non-core' (different 2-digit SIC) business line. Our results from these regressions, found in Table 6, indicate only minor differences across affiliate types; there is no statistically significant difference in the coefficients for land value and those for market-to-book value. Keiretsu membership has no effect on investment into core affiliates, while membership positively influences the odds of non-core investment. Here it is plausible to believe that the bank's knowledge of its client through its keiretsu ties increase the firm's ability to finance the more risky affiliate. In addition, TFP slightly reduces the log odds of investment into core affiliates, but strongly increases the odds of a non-core investment. This may indicate that more productive firms find it easier to expand into non-core business lines.

Finally we check whether our results could be driven by mergers and acquisitions as opposed to greenfield investment. This is unlikely to be the case, because greenfield investments comprise over 90% of annual investments in our sample. This is confirmed by the regression results for the "Greenfield Only" investment subsample reported in Table 6, which are similar to the full sample results in Table 3, column 5.

[22]For this reason, we also conducted analysis with the use of a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the main bank is rated by Moody's as "High" or "Highest Quality" (the range between Aaa and $Aa3$) and 0 if it is rated below this range ($A1$ or below). Our results stay stable with this change in ratings measurement: the bank health variable is positive and significant, while all other variables retain their signs and significance levels.

[23]Notice that the differences across periods in the coefficients for land value are not statistically significant.

5 Quantification

In this section we seek to quantify the effects of bank health and land value on FDI, so that we can assess the economic significance of our results. For this purpose we consider separate counterfactual exercises for land value and bank health. In each exercise we use the model from Table 3, column 4 to compute the predicted investment probabilities for representative levels of bank health and land value for an "average" investor, and analyze how these predicted investment probabilities change when we vary either bank health or land value. In addition, we compute the predicted individual investment probabilities of the firms in the sample and add them up to obtain the predicted number of investments; we then examine how the predicted number of investments changes with either bank health or land value.

Regarding land value we would like to know to what extent the boom in land prices has contributed to the sharp increase in the number of FDI projects in the late 1980s. To find out we compute the predicted investment probability holding all variables at their averages in 1990, at the peak of the land price bubble. This gives us a predicted investment probability for the "average" firm in 1990 of 0.062348. We then ask how much lower the investment probability of the "average" firm would have been if, holding everything else equal, we lower the land value from its peak in 1990 (133,040 million Yen) to the mean of the whole 1980-2000 sample (59,320 million Yen, about the average land value in 1987) or to the average level in the pre-boom years 1980-85 (29,942 million Yen). Lowering the land value to the sample mean, a 55% decrease, leads ceteris paribus to a predicted investment probability of 0.051688, a drop of 17%. Reducing the land value by 77% to the 1980-85 average, decreases the predicted investment probability of the average firm by 58% to 0.026477.

To get an idea of the corresponding change in the predicted number of investments we compute each firm's predicted investment probability for 1990 by using its individual 1990 values for all variables. By adding up these probabilities we obtain 81 predicted investments in 1990. Reducing each firm's land value to its individual sample average, holding all other variables fixed

at their 1990 levels, we obtain 63 investments, which corresponds to a fall of 22%. Alternatively, when we decrease each firm's land value to its 1980-85 average, the predicted number of investments falls by 50% to just 40 investments. These results have to be taken with a grain of salt, because we implicitly assume in our computations that, for instance, no firm has more than one investment. Still they indicate a substantial effect of land value on FDI, and thus an economically significant role for the collateral channel.

Regarding bank health we compare the investment probability for the "average" firm in 1986, when the market-to-book value of the banks was at its peak (9.60), with the investment probability that would have obtained, ceteris paribus, if the market-to-book value had been at the sample average (3.7, about the average for the 1980-85 period), a 61% decrease. In the former case the predicted investment probability is equal to 0.043047, in the latter case it is equal to 0.027917, which corresponds to a fall of 35%. In terms of the predicted number of investments, we obtain 73 investments by adding up the individual predicted investment probabilities of firms using the individual 1986 values for all variables. When we then lower, ceteris paribus, the market-to-book values of the respective banks to the sample average the predicted number of firms decreases to 42 investments, a 42% drop.

We can perform a similar exercise for the local maximum achieved by the market-to-book ratio in 1995. Specifically we compute the predicted investment probability holding all variables at their 1995 averages, and then reduce ceteris paribus the value of the market-to-book ratio to its 1996-2000 mean (a 55% drop from 3.73 to 1.65). This reduces the investment probability of the "average" 1995 firm by 57% from 0.04799 to 0.020425. By computing the individual investment probabilities of firms in 1995 and then adding them up we obtain 61 predicted investments in 1995. When we decrease, ceteris paribus, the market-to-book value of each firm's main bank to the 1996-2000 average, the predicted number of investments falls by 52% to 29 investments. Both counterfactual exercises for bank health indicate economically sizeable effects of bank health on FDI, which leads us to conclude that the lending channel, too, has an economically important effect.

6 Conclusions

The paper demonstrates that financial frictions have statistically significant and economically sizable effects on FDI. In particular, we identify two separate channels through which financial shocks are transmitted to FDI: a collateral channel and a lending channel. The collateral channel builds on the fact that in Japan and elsewhere land is the primary form of collateral. Changes in the value of its land affect a firm's ability to provide collateral to secure bank financing for its FDI projects. The lending channel, or RAC hypothesis, implies that FDI depends on the ability of banks to provide loans and thus on bank health.

To sort out the collateral and lending channels empirically we rely on microdata on Japanese FDI projects in the United States between 1980 and 2000. This time period is well suited for this task, not only because it exhibits considerable exogenous variation in land prices and in bank health at the firm level, but also because we can be reasonably sure that the big changes in Japanese FDI counts are not driven by changing investment conditions in the United States: FDI into the United States from other source countries simply does not exhibit the strong pattern we observe in Japanese FDI.

Focusing first on statistical significance, we find that land value is a significant determinant of FDI throughout the sample period. This is true, if we consider individual subperiods, such as years of the land price boom from 1986 to 1990, or the land price bust between 1991 and 1995; but it remains true for the periods prior to the land price boom and following the drop in land prices. We take this to be convincing evidence of the presence of a collateral channel.

Statistical evidence for the presence of a lending channel is also strong. Whether measured in terms of the market-to-book ratio or Moody's ratings, bank health turns out to be a significant determinant of FDI. The impact of bank health, however, appears to be weaker if we focus on the period 1986-1990, during which FDI boomed, apparently supported by the dramatic rise in the value of land, but bank health started to decline. Apparently banks were willing to finance the FDI boom at that time and, as our data

indicate, to increasingly support projects of smaller firms and firms without keiretsu ties that may not have been able to receive funding under "normal" circumstances. Thus an initial weakening of bank health during this period did not discourage FDI, at least not when combined with the strong rise in the value of land that could be used as collateral. What becomes evident especially in the regressions where we use Moody's ratings to measure bank health is that the effect of bank health is non-linear. The negative influence on FDI of a decline in bank health is typically felt only once banks have been downgraded sufficiently strongly.

Turning to the economic significance of our results we observe that both the collateral and the lending channel exert a strong influence on FDI. This can best be understood by considering several counterfactual exercises. Consider, for example, the year 1990, in which land values reached their peak just before the land price bubble burst. When we reduce each firm's land value from the 1990 level to the average level in the 1980-85 period, which corresponds to a 77% fall on average, the predicted number of investments decreases by 50%. Similarly we may consider the year 1986, in which bank health, measured by the yearly average market-to-book value, reached its maximum. Reducing the market-to-book value of each firm's main bank from its peak to its sample mean, a drop of 61% on average, reduces the predicted number of investments by 42%. A counterfactual exercise for the reduction in banks' market-to-book value during the Japanese banking crisis in the second half of the 1990s comes to roughly similar conclusions regarding the magnitude of the bank health effect on FDI.

Much more research is needed, of course, before the results we obtain for Japan can be generalized. But one thing we certainly learn is that financial frictions by themselves may have significant consequences for FDI, even if demand conditions remain stable. In light of the Japanese experience, it may appear premature to blame the drastic decline of FDI during the recent world financial crisis only on weak demand and an uncertain regulatory environment.

7 Appendix: Description of the Data and Data Sources

7.1 FDI

We examine count data on Japanese FDI into the United States. These data come from Toyo Keizai Inc.'s *Japanese Overseas Investment: A complete listing by firms and countries* (JOI). Data collected from the JOI for each investment includes: the name of the Japanese parent; the name, nationality and equity ownership percentage of each investing firm; the date and geographic location of initial investment into the affiliate; and the written description of each affiliate's main business line at the time of initial investment. We include an investment only if the principal Japanese investor held an equity ownership share of at least 10%, which is the standard OECD minimum equity ownership percentage threshold for an investment to be considered FDI.

There are three primary methods to determine a firm's main bank: (1) the presence of a bank employee on the firm's board of directors, (2) the bank with the largest shareholding in that firm, and (3) the bank listed as the primary "reference" bank in the *Japan Company Handbook* (JCH).[24] To remain consistent with previous studies, especially Klein et al. (2002), the primary reference bank listed in JCH serves as the main bank for our paper. In the few cases where the first bank listed was Norinchukin Bank or the Japan Development Bank, the first listed non-governmental bank serves as the main bank.[25] Note also that the client-bank relationship is not always stable—in every year of the sample there are a few firms that change their main bank. Over the sample period we identify 300 switches, almost all of them after 1994. In many cases the switch occurs between the first and second

[24] Gibson (1995) finds a 95-97% correlation between the three methods.

[25] Obviously, the influence that primary reference banks may have on their client firms is not homogeneous. For instance, firms that are members of a bank-centered keiretsu may have closer ties to their primary bank than non-members, given the keiretsu structure of information sharing through corporate presidents' council meetings, cross-shareholdings of stock, and the presence of bankers on clients' executive boards (Hoshi, et al., 1991). In addition large firms that list a reference bank may differ in how much credit they require from that bank because of their ability to generate funds from non-bank sources.

reference bank listed in the JCH, and in some cases firms switch back to their original main bank later in the sample period. It does not appear that firms switched banks in order to do FDI, as many of our recorded switches were by non-investing firms.

7.2 Investor Landholding

Data on Japanese firms' land holdings are found in the Pacific Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) database. This database provides annual data on the firm's land holdings (measured in millions of Yen). As noted by Gan (2007a) and others, Japanese firms are only required to provide the book value of this land, and not the land's market value. Thus, we have to convert the book values of the firms' land holdings to their market values, with this conversion accounting for both land price changes as well as firms' land purchases/sales.

Land values are calculated using the purchase price, which suggests a LIFO accounting technique to convert land prices to market value. However, as Hoshi and Kashyap (1990) indicate, several assumptions must be made before this calculation can occur. First, we cannot assume that the market and book values of land holdings are the same in our initial period, as a significant divergence between these two values may have occurred before the start of the book value time series. Thus, for firms with land holdings prior to 1980, the start of our sample period, we follow Hayashi and Inoue (1991) and Gan (2007a) and multiply the book value of landholdings in 1980 by a factor of 8 to obtain the market value.[26] For firms that entered our sample after 1980, we assume that the book and market values of their land holdings are equivalent at the time of entry.

Once we have established the market value of the firm's landholdings in 1980, we then allow this value to fluctuate annually only according to changes in Japanese land market values. This creates exogenous fluctuations in a firm's land values, eliminating concerns over endogeneity of land prices

[26]Hayashi and Inoue (1991) and Gan (2007a) use the value 7.582446 to calculate this divergence by 1969. Given that we start in 1980, we increased the factor to 8. Our results, however, are robust to using both 8 and 9 as the initial multiplier.

that would result from firm land sales/purchases during this period. Market land values are calculated from the Japanese Urban Land Price Index published by the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication in the *Japan Statistical Yearbook*. Regional variation in land prices and land price fluctuations exist across Japan during this period, and so we employ regional land price data to calculate market land price fluctuations. The postal code of the firm's headquarter is used to determine regional location. Approximately 85% of the sample firms are headquartered in one of the major Japanese urban areas, such as Tokyo, Yokohama, and Osaka, for which market land prices are available at the city- or metropolitan-level. Land values for the remaining firms were calculated using prefecture or national level land values.

7.3 Bank Health

We use two proxies for the health of each investor's main bank: the bank's market-to-book value and its Moody's long-term obligation rating. Applying the market-to-book value allows us to create a longer FDI timeline for our firms, as these data date back to 1977 for many Japanese banks, and 1980 for all of the banks in our sample.

Moody's ratings are, in descending order: Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2. As stated in Moody's *Ratings Symbols and Definitions*, "Moody's long-term obligation ratings are opinions of the relative credit risk of fixed-income obligations with an original maturity of one year or more. They address the possibility that a financial obligation will not be honored as promised. Such ratings use Moody's Global Scale and reflect both the likelihood of default and any financial loss suffered in the event of default."

7.4 Firm Characteristics

3-digit SIC codes for Japan-based investors can be determined from numerous publicly available sources such as Diamond Lead's Diamond's Japan Business Directory and Toyo Keizai's Japan Company Handbook (various

years). The JOI's verbal description of the affiliate's main business line allows for a clear determination of the affiliate's activities at the 2-digit SIC level. Six different firm-specific heterogeneity measures are used to capture a wide range of FDI-related firm characteristics. $TotalAssets$ is measured as the logarithm of the real value of a firm's total assets (excluding land holdings), where the nominal values are deflated by the Japanese wholesale price index. $MarketValue$ is measured as the logarithm of the total market capitalization of the firm. TFP is computed via Levinsohn-Petrin's (2003) method. Previous $InvestmentExperience$ identifies if the firm has a previous investment into the United States. $CashFlow$ is a measure of an investor's operating cash flow margin. It is calculated as the sum of income from firm operations scaled by total sales. Correlations between firm-specific characteristics are reported in Table 7.

Dodwell Marketing's *Industrial Groupings in Japan* is used to determine keiretsu membership of the investing firms as well as for each bank. Notice that keiretsu-affiliated banks lend to both keiretsu members and non-members. Keiretsu firms do not always have as its main bank a bank affiliated with its keiretsu. Finally, firms do on occasion leave a keiretsu.

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Figure 1: Annual Investment Counts By Japanese and Other Major Country Firms into the United States: 1980-2000



Source: U.S. International Trade Administration and Toyo Keizai, various years

Figure 2: Annual Investment Counts By the Japanese Firms in our Sample



Source: Author calculations from Toyo Keizai, various years

Figure 3: Average Firm's Land Values and Bank Health



Source: Author calculations from PACAP dataset

Table 1: Japanese Bank Ratings (Moody's Long-Term Obligation Ratings)

	1986[a]	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Asahi Bank	..	..	Aa3	Aa3	Aa3	Aa3	A1	A2	A2	A2	A2	Baa1	Baa1	Baa1	Baa1
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aa1	Aa1	Aa3	A1	A1	A1	A1	A3	Baa1	A3	Baa1
Daiwa Bank	..	..	..	Aa3	Aa3	Aa3	Aa3	A3	A3	Baa1	Baa1	Baa1	Baa1	Baa1	Baa1
Fuji Bank	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aa1	Aa3	Aa3	A1	A1	A1	A1	Baa1	Baa1	A3	Baa1
Indus. Bank of Japan	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aa2	Aa3	Aa3	A1	A1	A2	A3	Baa1	A3	Baa1
Long-Term Credit Bank	Aaa	Aa2	Aa2	Aa2	A1	A2	A2	A3	A3	Baa1	Baa1	Baa2	Baa2	Baa2	Baa2
Mitsubishi Bank	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aa1	Aa1	Aa3	Aa3	Aa3	Aa3	Aa2	Aa2	A1	A2	A2
Sakura Bank	..	..	Aa2	Aa3	Aa3	A1	A1	A2	A2	A3	A3	Baa1	Baa1	A3	Baa1
Sanwa Bank	Aaa	Aa1	Aa1	Aa1	Aa1	Aa1	Aa3	Aa3	Aa3	Aa3	Aa3	A1	A3	A3	A3
Sumitomo Bank	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aaa	Aa1	Aa3	Aa3	A1	A1	A1	A1	A2	A3	A3	A3
Tokai Bank	..	Aa2	Aa2	Aa2	Aa3	Aa3	A1	A2	A2	A2	A2	Baa1	Baa1	Baa1	Baa1

[a] Notes: Ratings from highest to lowest: Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2. Mitsubishi Bank merged with the Bank of Tokyo to form the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi in 1996. ".." indicates no Moody's rating.

Table 2: Data Descriptive Statistics

	All Firms			Investors Only		
Average Values*	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Average	Minimum	Maximum
LandValue[a]	59,320	10,107	809,516	106,982	17,312	809,516
TotalAssets[a,b]	48,890	727	893,644	93,069	3,498	893,644
TFP	4.00	1.03	15.43	4.27	1.03	15.43
InvestmentExperience	0.25	0	1	0.63	0	1
Keiretsu (%)	42.7	0	1	66.5	0	1
MarketValue[c]	0.17	0.01	0.92	0.19	0.01	0.84
CashFlow	0.07	-0.53	0.55	0.08	-0.33	0.41
Bank MarketToBook	3.70	0.11	14.56	3.81	0.11	14.38

* Notes: See Appendix for details on data construction and sources. a - Millions of Yen. b - Excluding Land. c - Billions of Yen

Table 3: Japanese FDI into US: 1980-2000

	1	2	3	4	5
LandValue	0.207***	0.270***	0.185***	0.159***	0.141***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.072)	(0.037)	(0.013)
LandValue*Keiretsu			-0.161***	-0.082**	-0.073**
			(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.006)
MarketToBook	0.120***	0.091***	0.031**	0.118***	0.113***
	(0.010)	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.035)	(0.027)
MarketToBook * Keiretsu			0.039	0.019	0.052
			(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.034)
Investor Firm-Level Variables					
Keiretsu			1.040***	0.453**	0.374**
			(0.146)	(0.207)	(0.155)
TotalAssets[a]				0.522***	0.429***
				(0.073)	(0.039)
TFP				0.014	0.005
				(0.012)	(0.004)
InvestmentExperience				0.807***	0.895***
				(0.118)	(0.139)
MarketValue				0.704**	0.776**
				(0.351)	(0.397)
CashFlow				4.485***	4.320***
				(2.52)	(1.117)
3-digit Industry-Time Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Firm-Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
N	21,740	12,432	19,264	17,447	12,432
Log Pseudolikelihood	-4366.487	-3980.916	-3849.933	-1681.464	-1039.514
Prob $>\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: Logit Model, log odds ratios reported. Standard errors clustered at industry-level. *,**,*** -Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. a - Excluding land.

Table 4: Japanese FDI into US by Subperiods: 1980-2000

	1980-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000
LandValue	0.389***	0.116***	0.133***	0.231**
	(0.088)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.132)
LandValue*Keiretsu	-0.298***	-0.065***	-0.052***	-0.199*
	(0.087)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.107)
MarketToBook	0.182**	0.034	0.294***	0.423***
	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.093)	(0.145)
MarketToBook * Keiretsu	-0.047	0.055	-0.496***	-0.181
	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.219)	(0.152)
Investor Firm-Level Variables				
Keiretsu	1.112***	0.415	2.304***	0.766**
	(0.395)	(0.438)	(0.634)	(0.384)
TotalAssets[a]	0.640***	0.533***	0.216**	0.306***
	(0.034)	(0.067)	(0.094)	(0.078)
TFP	0.014	0.004	0.006	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)
InvestmentExperience	0.574***	1.087***	0.865***	0.777***
	(0.129)	(0.178)	(0.202)	(0.287)
MarketValue	1.040*	0.347	0.352	0.790**
	(0.622)	(0.541)	(0.409)	(0.361)
CashFlow	2.452	3.117**	4.170**	8.141***
	(1.986)	(1.527)	(1.922)	(2.447)
N	3,516	3,014	3,320	2,582
Log PseudoLikelihood	-615.759	-908.328	-606.573	-472.774
Prob $>\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: Logit Model, log odds ratios reported. 3-digit industry-time and firm fixed effects, while not reported, are used. Standard errors clustered at industry-level. *,**,*** -Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. a - Excluding land.

Table 5: FDI into US, Using Moody's Ratings as Bank Health Measure

	1986-2000	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000
LandValue	0.117***	0.112***	0.140***	0.252*
	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.149)
LandValue*Keiretsu	-0.058***	-0.060***	-0.060***	-0.239*
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.126)
Keiretsu	0.589***	0.724***	0.646**	0.494**
	(0.100)	(0.172)	(0.278)	(0.233)
Bank Health				
Aaa	0.316*	-0.026	..	..
	(0.177)	(0.180)	(..)	(..)
Aa1	0.183	-0.134	1.237*	..
	(0.272)	(0.321)	(0.700)	(..)
Aa3	-0.725***	-0.170	0.068	-0.343
	(0.216)	(0.268)	(0.636)	(0.576)
A1	-0.819***	-1.008*	0.280	-0.582
	(0.245)	(0.557)	(0.660)	(0.461)
A2	-0.920***	..	0.245	-0.858***
	(0.164)	(..)	(0.555)	(0.245)
A3	-1.303***	..	0.029	-1.335***
	(0.213)	(..)	(0.686)	(0.299)
Baa1	-1.072***	..	0.392	-1.090***
	(0.158)	(..)	(1.33)	(0.261)
Baa2	-0.565**	..	..	-0.574
	(0.100)	(..)	(..)	(1.071)
N	8076	2495	2998	2583
Log PseudoLikelihood	-1852.16	-806.092	-550.628	-458.124
Prob $>\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: Logit Model, log odds ratios reported. Aa2 is the omitted variable. 3-digit industry-time and firm fixed effects, while not reported, are used. Standard errors clustered at industry-level. *,**,*** -Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. a - Excluding land. Other firm-level variables included in regression but omitted for brevity.

Table 6: Core, Non-Core, and Greenfield Only Investments

	Core	Non-Core	Greenfield Only
LandValue	0.093***	0.094***	0.110***
	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.046)
LandValue*Keiretsu	-0.067**	-0.061***	-0.061**
	(0.034)	(0.018)	(0.025)
MarketToBook	0.111***	0.101***	0.137***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.041)
MarketToBook * Keiretsu	0.524	0.038	-0.030
	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.046)
Investor Firm-Level Variables			
Keiretsu	0.338	0.456**	0.603**
	(0.222)	(0.211)	(0.261)
TotalAssets[a]	0.430***	0.423***	0.504***
	(0.059)	(0.047)	(0.057)
TFP	-0.018*	0.015***	0.010
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.007)
InvestmentExperience	1.060***	0.656***	1.073***
	(0.127)	(0.139)	(0.161)
MarketValue	0.495	0.961***	1.010**
	(0.306)	(0.312)	(0.397)
CashFlow	4.314***	3.451***	4.377***
	(1.223)	(1.184)	(1.435)
N	21,133	21,133	21,133
Log PseudoLikelihood	-1714.745	-1547.138	-962.517
Prob $>\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: Logit Model, log odds ratios reported. 3-digit industry-time and firm fixed effects, while not reported, are used. Standard errors clustered at industry-level. *,**,*** -Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. a - Excluding land.

Table 7: Correlations Between Firm Level Characteristics

	LandValue	MarketToBook	Keiretsu	TotalAssets	TFP	Invst. Exp.	MarketValue	CashFlow
LandValue	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
MarketToBook	0.060	1	..	..	..	..	..	..
Keiretsu	0.104	0.067	1	..	..	..	..	..
TotalAssets	0.127	-0.015	0.183	1	..	..	..	..
TFP	0.217	-0.051	-0.087	0.308	1	..	..	..
Invest.Exp.	0.184	-0.074	0.228	0.392	0.037	1	..	..
MarketValue	0.111	0.001	-0.056	-0.062	0.160	0.096	1	..
CashFlow	0.148	0.081	0.099	0.052	0.078	-0.037	0.131	1