Ph.D. Programme Quantitative Economics

Summer term 2019

Date Speaker Topic
08.04.2019 Carsten Schröder
DIW
A Head-to-Head Comparison of Augmented Wealth in Germany and the United States
Host: Prof. Ulrich Schmidt
29.04.2019 Erich-Schneider Speed Seminar
15 min talks plus discussion

Prof. Sebastian Köhne:
"Distributional Consequences of Medical Progress"

Tariq Chaudhry (Doctoral Candidate as of 2013):
"Islamic Banking: A Basic Macroeconomic Approach"

Richard Schnorrenberger (Doctoral Candidate as of 2017):
"Efficient inference in the dynamic Nelson-Siegel Model with multivariate wishart stochastic volatility"

Ole Wilms (Tilburg University):
"Because all Moments Matter: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Long-Run Risk Models"

06.05.2019 Dr. Dimitri Kroujiline
LGT Capital Partners
Tractable interactions-based macroeconomic model with microfoundations
We derive a tractable interactions-based macroeconomic model from microfoundations with the objective to improve our understanding of macroeconomic dynamics and, in particular, highlight sources of instability.
Host: Prof. Thomas Lux
13.05.2019 Prof. Heinz Kurz
University of Graz
The "law" of the falling tendency of the rate of profit - from Adam Smith up until today
Host: Prof. Christian Seidl
20.05.2019 Horst Zank
Manchester
An Effective and Simple Tool for Measuring Loss Aversion
Under prospect theory a truth-telling mechanism for assessing personal benefits, the quadratic scoring rule, is exploited to develop a new measurement tool for loss aversion. As the latter is a local measure of behavior at the reference point, exhibited as a concave kink in the utility, and utility can be assumed linear for small scale gains or losses, we can directly measure loss aversion without invoking the elicitation of entire utility functions. Under these assumptions and testable properties of probability weighting functions, an experimenter can identify the degree of loss aversion of a subject with only two quadratic scoring rule questions. The additional benefits of the new tool are inherited from characeristic properties of scoring rules: simplicity of implementation for experiments, easy to understand for experimental subjects, incentive compatibility, and lack of error propagation.
Host: Prof. Ulrich Schmidt
27.05.2019 Erwin Ooghe
KU Leuven
Prices, queues, and taxes
In his thought-provoking book What Money Can't Buy. The Moral Limits of Markets, Sandel (2012) states that some nonmarket way of allocationg goods, such as the ethics of the queue (first come, first served), are gradually being displaced by the ethics of the market. He highlights inequality as one of two reasons why we should care about this tendency: "In a society where everything is for sale, life is harder for those of modest means. (Sandel, 2012: 8)" I investigate whether queuing can improve redistribution in a second-best setting where also commodity and earnings taxes are available. I specify first a set of bench-mark assumptions - reminiscent of Atkinson and Stiglitz' (1976) model - and show that it is never optimal to introduce queuing. Contrary to Sandel, it suggets that introducing more market and less queuing has the potential to improve the utility of "those of modest means". Afterwards, I relax some of the assumptions. Two cases pro queuing seem promising: differentiated queuing and paternalism.
Host: Prof. Sebastian Köhne
03.06.2019 Roland Winkler
University of Antwerpen
The Government Spending Multiplier at the Zero Lower Bound: International Evidence from Historical Data
Host: Jan-Niklas Brenneisen
12.06.2019 Prof. Moritz Kuhn
University of Bonn
What hides behind the German labor market miracle? Unemployment insurance reforms and labor market dynamics
Host: Prof. Sebastian Köhne
17.06.2019 Simon Galle
BI Norwegian Business School
Slicing the Pie: Quantifying the Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Trade

Host: Thilo Kroeger

24.06.2019 Prof. Sebastian Schwenen
TU München
Technology Policy and Market Structure: Evidence from the Power Sector
Host: Prof. Katrin Rehdanz
28.06.2019 Nora Szech
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance
We investigate the elasticity of preferences for moral ignorance with respect to monetary incentives and social norm information. We propose a model where uncertainty differentially decreases the moral costs of unethical behavior, and benchmark the demand curve for moral ignorance against morally neutral context. In line with the model, selfishness is a main determinant of moral ignorance, and the demand curve for moral ignorance is highly elastic when information shifts from being costly to incentivized. Moral ignorance is considered morally inappropriate. Providing this information increases moralbehavior but does not shift the demand curve for ignorance.
Host: Prof. Menusch Khadjavi
01.07.2019 Paul Hünermund
Maastricht University
Public Procurement of Innovation: Evidence from a German Legislative Reform
The use of public procurement to promote private innovation activities has attracted increasing attention recently. Germany implemented a legal change in its procurement framework in 2009, which allowed government agencies to specify innovative aspects of procured products as selection criteria in tender calls. We analyze a representative sample of German firms to investigate whether this reform stimulated innovation in the business sector. Across a wide set of specifications - OLS, nearest-neighbor matching, IV regressions and difference-in-differences - we find a robust and significant effect of innovation-directed public procurement on turnover from new products and services. However, our results show that the effect is largely attributable to innovations of more incremental nature rather than market novelties.
Host: Patrick Nüß / Prof. James Konow
08.07.2019 Emeline Bezin The tragedy of the commons and socialization: theory and policy
Host: Prof. Till Requate