Doctoral Programme Quantitative Economics

Erich-Schneider-Seminar

Weekly seminar of the Department of Economics on mondays, 4:15 - 5:30 p.m.

Organizer: Dr. Rüdiger Voss

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Summer term 2021

10.05.2021: Ralph Ossa, ETH Zürich

May 10, 2021 from 04:15 PM to 05:30 PM

virtual lecture

Speaker: Prof. Ralph Ossa, ETH Zürich

Title: Are Trade Agreements Good for You?

Abstract:

We examine how deep agreements on domestic regulations a§ect welfare in a world where such agreements are ináuenced by producer lobbies. The answer to this question depends in a critical way on whether the agreement focuses on product standards or on production regulations. International cooperation on product standards can decrease welfare, and this is more likely to happen when producer lobbies are stronger. On the other hand, international cooperation on production regulations tends to enhance welfare when lobbying pressures are strong. A key determinant of the welfare impact of deep agreements is whether the interests of producer lobbies in di§erent countries are aligned or in conáict: the former situation tends to occur in the case of product standards, while the latter situation tends to occur in the case of production regulations.

Full paper to be found here: 

Host: Prof. Horst Raff

Zoom-Link:

https://uni-kiel.zoom.us/j/68105309628?pwd=dzJ1QmlPbEpxNWo1UU9MVnE0UUFVQT09

 

 

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17.05.2021: Michael Stolpe, IfW; DFG-Cluster of Excellence “Precision Medicine”; Leibniz Research Alliance INFECTIONS

May 17, 2021 from 04:15 PM to 05:30 PM

virtual lecture

Speaker: Dr. Michael Stolpe, IfW; DFG-Cluster of Excellence “Precision Medicine”; Leibniz Research Alliance INFECTIONS

Title: Ethics, Technology and Healthcare Demand in Open Economies

Abstract:

We develop an open economy model to explain how demand for healthcare is influenced by distributional ethics at home and innovation in medical technology abroad.   With international trade in medical technology, countries pursuing distributional objectives may be tempted to use the monopsony power of a national health system to suppress prices and rely on the innovation incentives provided by other sufficiently large countries that do not pursue distributional objectives.  From a global point of view, the private and societal incentives for innovation may diverge which may lead to underinvestment in health and international trade conflicts.Full paper to be found here: 

Host: Prof. Gabriel Felbermayr

Zoom-Link:

https://uni-kiel.zoom.us/j/69850689793?pwd=azlkaXlaVDAvZzRUNzl3L2F5cTFWdz09

 

 

 

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